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Abstract 
This paper examines how the analysis of inflation targeting (IT) adoption is affected by 
allowing for a structural change after adoption, using panel probit models for 60 countries over 
the period 1985-2008. Our findings suggest that there is a structural change after IT adoption. 
Including the post-adoption period when estimating the factors of IT adoption leads to biased 
results when interested in the question as of what drives countries’ decision to adopt IT. 
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1. Introduction 
Inflation targeting (IT) is a monetary policy strategy that involves the public announcement of 
medium-term targets for inflation and strong commitment of the central bank to achieving price 
stability. By the end of 2011, 31 countries had implemented IT. Due to the increasing 
popularity of IT, it is important to know what drives countries to its adoption. 
Several studies analyze empirically the factors leading to IT (e.g., Mishkin and Schmidt-
Hebbel, 2001; Hu, 2006; Mukherjee and Singer, 2008). However, their methodological 
approach does not differentiate between the factors of IT adoption and the factors of IT 
continuation; as a result, they simultaneously examine both. These studies commonly use the 
full sample for estimation, i.e. keep observations before and after adoption, until the end of the 
analyzed period. Such data treatment may cause endogeneity and asymmetry problems, leading 
to biased results.  
This paper examines how the analysis of IT adoption is affected by this choice of the 
analyzed period. We apply panel probit models on the dataset of Samarina and de Haan (2013) 
and test whether IT adoption constitutes a structural change, as a result of which country 
characteristics influence the choice of IT differently before and after its adoption.  
When analyzing the decision to apply or not to apply IT at a specific moment in time, one 
should take into account which monetary strategy a country has so far used (IT or non-IT). The 
decision to switch from non-IT to IT might not be symmetric to the decision to switch from IT 
to non-IT. It seems to be institutionally and politically easier to switch from non-IT to IT than 
vice versa. Hence, we cannot model this process symmetrically. Indeed, the asymmetry is 
present in real life as we do not observe (at least up to now) any transition from IT to an 
alternative monetary policy strategy. So far, none of the IT countries has been forced to 
abandon it. Thus, once a country adopts IT, the self-reinforcing mechanisms make IT enduring.  
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Our empirical findings indeed suggest that the decision to apply IT is different from the 
decision to continue IT. The factors related to IT differ significantly between the pre- and post-
adoption periods, indicating that IT adoption creates a structural change in institutional and 
economic characteristics of a country. Most notably, the effect of inflation on the probability of 
IT adoption is largely overestimated in the model including the post-adoption period compared 
to the one without this period. Thus, using the full sample for analyzing IT adoption leads to 
biased parameter estimates. This bias causes an overstatement of the importance of variables 
that are pushed by the actual implementation of IT.  
2. Theoretical framework 
IT has proven to be a durable monetary policy strategy: so far no country has been forced to 
give it up.1 The possible reason for the high durability of IT is its endogeneity.2 As an 
explanation of this endogeneity, we refer to the literature on Optimum Currency Areas (Frankel 
and Rose, 1996; Rose, 2000). In such studies it is argued that countries are more likely to 
satisfy the criteria for entry into a currency union ex post than ex ante. That is, even if a 
currency union is not an optimal choice for a country at the point of its accession, the process of 
economic and trade integration will transform the economic fundamentals and institutions in 
such a way that a currency union becomes an optimal regime after all. Consequently, given the 
self-reinforcing mechanisms and on top of that the asymmetry in political consequences, it 
becomes more difficult and costly to exit a currency union than to stay in.   
																																																								
1	Note that three EU members (Finland, Spain, and Slovakia) abandoned IT when they joined the euro area. 
However, this decision was caused by the institutional commitment to adopt the euro and to unify their monetary 
policy conduct with the ECB. Although these EMU countries gave up explicit IT, their new monetary policy 
strategy under the ECB framework resembles implicit IT (Rose, 2007). 
2 In this paper, endogeneity of IT is understood in a broader economic sense - endogenous means 'having an 
internal cause or origin'. Thus, when we say that IT is endogenous, we infer that its continuation is internally 
affected by the institutions and economic conditions that are shaped under the IT regime.	
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Similar mechanisms may be at work for IT. Although some countries do not satisfy initial 
conditions for IT adoption, they may choose to apply IT anyway in a belief of its effectiveness 
in controlling inflation. Once IT is in place, country characteristics and institutions 
subsequently develop in a way that supports the IT framework. As institutions adjust to 
functioning under IT, it reinforces the decision of the central bank to maintain IT, making it an 
endogenously determined optimal choice. In this situation, abandoning IT becomes more 
difficult than keeping this strategy. The decision to give up IT after years of its implementation 
may undermine the credibility of the central bank and destabilize inflation expectations.  
Given the endogeneity of IT, there is an asymmetry in the monetary strategy choice. The 
(importance of) factors influencing the decision to continue or exit IT are likely to be different 
from those affecting the decision to adopt or not adopt IT. Ignoring the asymmetry and 
structural change leads to biased estimation results and inadequate statistical inference.  
Therefore, we test the hypothesis: 
IT adoption creates a structural change in economic and institutional conditions. As a result, 
the factors driving IT adoption are different from those leading to IT continuation. 
Special attention in this analysis is given to inflation, considered to be the most important 
factor driving IT adoption. Previous studies find that lower inflation increases the probability to 
adopt IT (see Samarina and de Haan, 2013). At the same time, the implementation of IT helps 
to maintain low inflation. As inflation after IT adoption is affected by the use of this strategy, 
the importance of this variable could be overstated. Thus, we expect that the estimated effect of 
inflation on the probability of IT adoption is overestimated in models that do not distinguish 
between the pre- and post-adoption periods. 
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3. Methodology 
The study employs a panel binary choice model where the dependent variable yit takes the value 
1 if country i implements IT in year t, and 0 otherwise. We follow the literature and use a 
random effects probit to account for unobserved cross-country heterogeneity.3 The estimation is 
conducted by Maximum Likelihood. 
To test whether the explanatory variables influence the probability of IT choice differently 
before and after IT adoption, we employ a structural break analysis. Let D(τ) be a time function, 
where τ measures the duration of IT in years, starting from 0 in the adoption year. The 
unrestricted model has the form:  
ܲݎ݋ܾ൫ݕ௜௧ ൌ 1ห ௜ܺ,௧ିଵ,, ܦሺ߬ሻ, ߤ௜൯ ൌ ߔ൫ߙ ൅ ߚ ௜ܺ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߠܦሺ߬ሻ ൅ ߣሺ ௜ܺ,௧ିଵ ൈ ܦሺ߬ሻሻ ൅ ߤ௜൯,	      (1) 
where ݕ௜௧ ൌ 1 if ݕ௜௧∗ ൐ 0, ݕ௜௧ ൌ 0 if ݕ௜௧∗ ൑ 0, ݕ௜௧∗  is an unobserved latent variable which 
describes the decision to adopt IT; ߔሺ. ሻ is a cdf of a standard normal distribution;   is a 
constant term; , θ, λ  are vectors of parameters; ௜ܺ,௧ିଵ is a matrix of explanatory variables, 
lagged one year, as current decisions of central banks rely on the history of analyzed factors; 
ሺ ௜ܺ,௧ିଵ ൈ ܦሺ߬ሻሻ is a matrix of interaction terms between the explanatory variables and ܦሺ߬ሻ;	ߤ௜ 
are random effects, uncorrelated with the regressors, ߤ௜| ௜ܺ,௧ିଵ, ܦሺ߬ሻ~ܰሺ0, ߪఓଶሻ.  
Given that the adjustment of country characteristics to IT implementation is a gradual 
process, we introduce D(τ) as a smooth transition function of time. Such specification takes into 
account that it may take more than one year to accommodate the economic conditions and 
institutions so as to be compatible with the IT framework. For ߬ ൐ 0, ܦሺ߬ሻ is the exponential 
smooth transition function specified as: 
ܦሺ߬ሻ ൌ 1 െ ݁൫ିఊఛమ൯; ߛ ൐ 0,                          (2) 
																																																								
3 Pooled probit specifications do not lead to qualitatively different results. These results are available in Table A.3 
in the Annex. A fixed effects model would drop all countries that did not adopt IT and has therefore not been used 
in previous studies of IT adoption either. 	
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where ߛ is a speed of transition; a smaller value of ߛ implies a slower transition.4 For the pre-
adoption period, ߬ ൌ 0 and ܦሺ߬ሻ ൌ 0, the estimated parameters for the explanatory variables 
correspond to vector . For the post-adoption period, ߬ ൐ 0 and ܦሺ߬ሻ ൐ 0, the parameters are , 
θ, and λ. 
The restricted model has the form:  
ܲݎ݋ܾ൫ݕ௜௧ ൌ 1ห ௜ܺ,௧ିଵ, ߤ௜൯ ൌ Φ൫ߙ ൅ ߚ ௜ܺ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߤ௜൯.               (3) 
The estimation procedure is the following: first, we estimate the restricted model; then, we 
fit the unrestricted model and use a Wald test to test for the joint significance of the interaction 
terms and ܦሺ߬ሻ. Testing for a structural break implies the following null and alternative 
hypotheses: 
ܪ଴:	there is no structural break, i.e. all interaction terms with ܦሺ߬ሻ plus ܦሺ߬ሻ itself have jointly 
insignificant coefficient estimates;  
ܪଵ:	there is a structural break after IT adoption, i.e. either the coefficient of ܦሺ߬ሻ or at least one 
of the interaction terms are significantly different from zero. 
4. Data  
We use the dataset of Samarina and de Haan (2013). It consists of 60 countries over the period 
1985-2008, out of which 30 countries implemented IT and 30 countries did not. Table A.1 
(Annex) provides the list of countries with IT adoption dates. We conduct estimations for 
official adoption dates according to the central banks’ documents.5  
We include those 6 variables that are found significant by Samarina and de Haan (2013). 
These are: inflation, output volatility, flexible exchange rate regime dummy, exchange rate 
																																																								
4 As a robustness check, we use a different specification of D(τ), namely ܦሺ߬ሻ ൌ ݁ିఘ/ఛ, where ρ ൒ 0 and a larger 
value of ρ means a slower transition. The results with this specification (and different values of ߩ) are qualitatively 
similar to the ones with D(τ) specified in equation (2). These results are available in Samarina and Sturm (2013). 
5	Alternative dates for soft IT and full-fledged IT adoption are used in a robustness check and available on request. 
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volatility, government debt and financial development.6 Table A.2 (Annex) describes the 
explanatory variables.  
5. Empirical results 
Table 1 presents the estimation results of random effects probit models using official adoption 
dates. We report average partial effects at ̅ߤ ൌ 0. In the function ܦሺ߬ሻ we set ߛ ൌ 1, which 
implies a transition half-life (i.e. when ܦሺ߬ሻ ൌ 0.5) of 10 months. 
The Wald test statistics indicate that all interaction terms with ܦሺ߬ሻ plus ܦሺ߬ሻ itself are 
jointly significant in the unrestricted models. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis in favor of the 
alternative that there is a structural break after IT adoption.  
Our results point to substantial differences between restricted and unrestricted models in 
terms of significance and magnitude of partial effects for the explanatory variables. In the 
unrestricted models we find significant but smaller effects (in absolute sense) for inflation and 
the exchange rate variables. Especially for inflation this points to a large overestimation bias in 
the restricted model. Furthermore, the estimate of government debt turns significant and those 
of financial development and output volatility insignificant in the unrestricted models. All three 
change signs.  
Since we cannot estimate ߛ directly, we conduct a robustness analysis to check how 
sensitive the results are to the choice of ߛ. Figure 1 shows the estimated partial effects for each 
explanatory variable across different values of ߛ that are used to measure half-lives of 
transition. On the graphs the half-life of transition varies from 45 months (i.e. ߛ ൌ 0.05) to 6 
months (i.e. ߛ ൌ 3). We find that the outcomes – with the exception of inflation – do not vary 
																																																								
6 The dataset contains 6 additional variables that have also been used in previous studies (e.g., Hu, 2006; 
Mukherjee and Singer, 2008): output growth, fiscal balance, trade openness, external debt, market-based financial 
structure and an index of actual central bank instrument independence. Including these variables as well does not 
change the conclusions. Results are available in Samarina and Sturm (2013).	
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substantially across ߛ in terms of sign and significance of the estimated effects. For inflation, 
the estimated effects become much smaller (in absolute value) as transition is allowed to go 
faster. Moreover and as to be expected, the slower is the transition to IT (corresponding to a 
higher half-life of transition), the closer our estimates get to the restricted model. However, 
even for a very slow transition, the results from the unrestricted models remain significantly 
different from the restricted.    
 
Table 1. Estimation results – random effects probit 
Variables Restricted    Unrestricted, D(τ)=1-e-τ² 
 
Inflation -3.483*** -0.496*** 
 (1.050) (0.190) 
Output volatility -0.006* 0.0005 
(0.003) (0.001) 
Flexible exchange rate regime 0.094*** 0.060*** 
 (0.035) (0.019) 
Exchange rate volatility 0.015* 0.012*** 
 (0.009) (0.005) 
Government debt 0.001 -0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.0003) 
Financial development 0.118** -0.032 
 (0.050) (0.021) 
Observations 1009 1009 
Log-likelihood -240.0 -128.6 
Wald test p-value  0.00 
Notes: The Table reports average partial effects and their standard errors (in brackets). Interaction terms are 
included in the unrestricted model, but not reported. ***, **, and * indicate the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. Wald test p-value indicates the significance level for rejecting the null hypothesis of joint 
insignificance of interaction terms and D(τ). 
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Fig. 1.  Average partial effects for ࡰሺ࣎ሻ ൌ ૚ െ ࢋ൫ିࢽ࣎૛൯. 
     
	 			 	
  		  
Notes: Solid lines show the estimated partial effects for each explanatory variable, while dashed lines are 95% 
confidence intervals around the partial effects. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper we test whether country characteristics influence the probability to apply IT 
differently before and after adoption. We find that there is a structural change in economic and 
institutional characteristics occurring during and after IT adoption. The factors leading to IT 
adoption differ significantly between the periods before and after adoption due to the 
asymmetry and endogeneity of IT. Importantly, the effect of inflation on the probability of IT 
adoption is largely overestimated in the model including the post-adoption period. Hence, using 
the full sample for analyzing the factors of IT adoption produces biased parameter estimates.  
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ANNEX 
 
Table A.1. List of countries with IT adoption dates 
IT countries (30) 
Armenia  
Australia 
Brazil                       
Canada 
Chile 
Colombia 
Czech Republic 
Finland  
Ghana 
Guatemala 
2006 
1993 
1999 
1991 
1991 
2000 
1998 
1993 
2007 
2005 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Indonesia  
Israel 
Mexico 
New Zealand 
Norway  
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
2001 
2001 
2005 
1992 
2001 
1990 
2001 
2002 
2002 
1999 
Romania 
Slovakia  
South Africa 
South Korea 
Spain  
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Thailand 
Turkey 
 United Kingdom 
2005 
2005 
2000 
1998 
1995 
1993 
2000 
2000 
2006 
1993 
Non-IT countries (30) 
Austria  
Belgium             
Denmark  
France 
Germany            
Greece            
Ireland 
Italy  
Japan 
Luxemburg 
Netherlands  
Portugal 
United States 
Argentina              
Bolivia                  
Bulgaria 
China 
Costa Rica 
Cyprus  
Egypt 
Estonia  
India 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Malaysia 
Pakistan  
Panama 
Singapore 
Sudan 
Venezuela 
Sources: Samarina and de Haan (2013) 
 
 
Table A.2. Variables and their description 
 Analyzed variable Description  
Inflation CPI inflation rate, transformed as 
100/1
100/



 
Output volatility Annual standard deviation of monthly Industrial Production  
growth rates 
Flexible exchange rate regime 1 – floating exchange rate regime, 0 – otherwise 
Exchange rate volatility  Annual standard deviation of monthly percentage changes in REER 
Government debt  Central government debt (in % GDP) 
Financial development Private credit by banks and other financial institutions/GDP 
Source: for data sources, see Samarina and de Haan (2013) 
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Table A.3. Estimation results – pooled probit 
Variables Restricted Unrestricted, D(τ)=1-e-τ² 
 
Inflation -2.651***
 
-0.323** 
 (0.652) (0.131) 
Output volatility -0.002 0.001 
(0.006) (0.001) 
Flexible exchange rate regime 0.236*** 0.053*** 
 (0.058) (0.016) 
Exchange rate volatility 0.055*** 0.011*** 
 (0.017) (0.004) 
Government debt -0.002 -0.001** 
 (0.002) (0.0003) 
Financial development -0.082 -0.030* 
 (0.080) (0.018) 
Observations 1009 1009 
Log-likelihood -468.8 -132.2 
Wald test p-value  0.00 
Notes: The Table reports average marginal effects and their robust standard errors (in brackets). Interaction terms 
are included in the unrestricted model, but not reported. ***, **, and * indicate the significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. Wald test p-value indicates the significance level for rejecting the null hypothesis of joint 
insignificance of interaction terms and D(τ). 
 
